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The Case of the Detrimental Drug: Implications for the Stakeholder Theory of Directorship 
 
J. Scott Armstrong 
 
 
The Winter 1979 issues of Directors and Boards presented readers with a questionnaire based to a 
degree on a 1969 board incident at Upjohn Corporation [see Box 1 (on page 2) and Box 2 (on pages 3-4)]. In 
this questionnaire, a profitable drug named “Wondola” was being produced by the so-called International 
Drug Corporation (IDC). Readers were told that members of the American Medical Association's Council on 
Drugs had objected to the sale of most fixed -ratio (combination) drugs on the grounds that they grant no 
benefits superior to those of single-ingredient drugs, and are more likely to produce detrimental side effects, 
including death. Wondola, with an approximated fatality record of 14 to 22 deaths per year, was no 
exception. The Federal Drug Administration had asked IDC to withdraw the drug. Readers were asked how 
they would have voted at a board meeting called to resolve the withdrawal issue. 
 
Several months after the publication of the first questionnaire, follow-up questionnaires were sent to 
D&B readers and to select corporate constituents. These letters solicited comments on a “stakeholder” 
theory of board membership which I proposed in conjunction with the Wondola experiment. In the following 
pages, I present the background of the experiment. The stakeholder theory will then be proposed as a 
solution to the “responsiblity dilemma” the Wondola case raises. Finally, questionnaire respondents will 
speak for themselves on this complex issue. 
 
 
Early research results 
The Wondola case, drawn from Morton Mintz’s coverage of the controversy surrounding the 
Upjohn drug Panalba, was used in a research project I conducted from February 1972 to March 1977, the 
results of which were published in the year of its completion.1 Since 1977, discussions and summaries of the 
project have appeared on radio and television, as well as in newspapers and periodicals, demonstrating it to 
be a subject of public interest. 
 
The participants in the early Panalba-based project were drawn from management courses and 
seminars attended by undergraduate and graduate students as well as executives. Thirty-three people 
administered the experiment as a teaching vehicle in ten countries (the number of experiments conducted in 
each is indicated in parentheses): U.S. (166), Sweden (109), Belgium (11), France (8), Canada (6), Norway 
(4), England (8), Denmark (3), Finland (2), and Mexico (2). No one in the sample had heard of Panalba. 
Subjects received background information on the case [see Wondola questionnaire, pages 6-7 below]. Once 
assigned roles, they were divided into 7-person groups, each of which represented the Board of Directors of 
the Upjohn Corporation. My colleagues and I tried to make the roles conform closely to those of the Upjohn 
board members in 1968, using both Upjohn’s annual report for that year and Mintz’s study as bases. This 
required some improvisation, since Mintz did not report some of the information needed for such a 
recreation, and the Upjohn Corporation, prior to publication of this experiment, was not willing to comment 
on the case. Participants were asked to act as if they had assumed the role of the person described. 
 
Of the 57 groups in the control condition for role playing, none removed the drug from the market. 
Furthermore, 79 percent of these groups selected e, the most extreme decision-to take “legal, political and other 
necessary actions to prevent authorities from banning Panalba.” 
 
                                                 
1 Morton Mintz, “F.D.A. and Panalba: A Conflict of Commercial and Therapeutic Goals,” Science (1969), 
pp. 875-81. My research was published in “Social Irresponsibility in Management,” Journal of Business 
Research (Sept. 1977), pp. 185-213. 
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On the other hand, when a similar subject population was tested for its reaction to such decisions without hav-
ing been assigned roles, the majority of them deemed the continued sale of the drug irresponsible. 
 
It would seem then that action and contemplation yield different choices. How is this possible? 
 
This question has general implications for corporate boards. The specific points of the Panalba story are not of 
major concern here – neither is the fact that the real and recreated Upjohn board members pursued choice e. The 
experiment could have been based on any one of countless cases in which board members – with varying degrees of 
awareness of product danger-have allowed detrimental products to be sold. Consider the current example of 
SmithKline’s Tagamet, or the cases of Occidental Chemical Company and asbestos, Allied Chemical and kepone, 
DuPont and benzidine, Ford and Pinto – all recently reviewed in light of proposed bill HR 4973, “to amend title 18 of 
the United States Code to impose penalties with respect to certain nondisclosure by business entities with respect to 
dangerous products.”2 The point is that when faced with a choice between benefiting stockholders or other 
constituencies, the director in our current board structure will favor the former even if the thought of bringing 
detriment to other parties provokes clashes with his or her conscience. 
 
 
 
UPJOHN’S VIEW ON PANALBA 
 
Armstrong has based his research on a corporate 
decision-making case detailed by Morton Mintz, “FDA 
and Panalba: A Conflict of Commercial and Therapeutic 
Goals,” (see endnote 1). Since Mintz wrote his piece, 
both pro- and anti-Panalba sides have had their 
additional say in this project. The producer of Panalba, 
Upjohn, has been contacted from the early stages of 
Armstrong’s research. In a letter dated October 30, 
1979, Joseph T. Heywood, Upjohn's Director of Cor-
porate and Media Relations, cited the May 1979 state-
ment of Upjohn President Dr. William N. Hubbard, Jr. 
Addressing shareholders at the company's annual 
meeting, Dr. Hubbard stated: 
“Finally, and in a somewhat different context, I would 
call to memory the departed fixed combination of 
tetracyclin and novo-biocin named Panalba. I would 
suppose that no single therapeutic agent in the history 
of pharmacology has ever been subjected to the kind of 
criticisms that this preparation received at the time 
when controlled clinical trials became, through 
regulation, the unique source of acceptable data for 
effectiveness. Panalba was, as you all know, withdrawn 
from the market under pressure of these attacks. 
 
“Today, I would simply recount that, in laboratory 
experiments, it has now been well demonstrated that 
the fixed combination is more effective than either  
compound  separately in the inhibition of resistance in 
some microorganisms found in common respiratory 
infections.” 
 
In his recent letter, Heywood points out that Panalba 
has been sold outside the U.S. as AlbamycinT for the 
past 20 years. Among the thirty countries which 
approve general use of this drug, Upjohn cites the 
United Kingdom, Canada, France, Switzerland and 
Belgium. All of these countries, Heywood argues, 
“possess regulatory authorities on par with FDA, and in 
some cases may exceed FDA in expertise and effec-
tiveness in the public interest. The authorities in these 
countries did not agree with FDA and its decision on 
fixed combination antibiotics.” 
 
Heywood closed his letter with the following strong 
words: “The Upjohn Company continues to believe that 
the FDA's action against the product was arbitrary and 
capricious. The FDA action injured the company 
financially, but, more importantly, it denied physicians 
and patients the use of a very useful medicine. Given the 
same situation, we would fight FDA in the courts again, 
not because of ‘blind obedience to authority,’ but 
because FDA was wrong.” 
 
                                                 
2 Cf. Scott A. Baris, “Smith Kline's Revival: But A New Drug Triggers a Controversy,” New York Times 
(Sept. 16, 1979), pp. 1 ff., and Democratic Rep. George Miller, remarks on “Corporate Responsibility and 
Hazardous Materials,” in the House of Representatives, 96th Congress, November 15, 1979 rep. in the 
Congressional Record (Nov. 15, 1979), E5656-59. 
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INSTRUCTIONS IN THE ORIGINAL PANALBA EXPERIMENT* 
 
Instructions. The major instructions given to the sub-
jects are provided below. The italicized statements 
were also written on the blackboard. 
“I am providing one envelope to each group. Please 
do not write on these materials unless you are the Chair-
man. The Chairman will complete a group decision 
form. When you receive the envelope, please 
remove the contents, take the ‘role’ on top and pass 
the roles to the person on your right, etc., until 
everyone has a role. 
“When you receive your role, remove the 3 x 5 card 
and place it on you or in front of you so that the 
others in your group can tell who you are. Then 
read your role and act as you would act if you were in 
the role which is described. (Repeat this.) Improvise as 
necessary but do not step out of your role. The roles all 
differ, so do not discuss your role with others in 
your group. 
“This meeting has been called by E. G. Upjohn, the 
Chairman of the Board at Upjohn. Due to time pres-
sures, your group must reach a decision in 45 
minutes. Dr. Upjohn will start the meeting as soon as 
you have read your roles.” 
Roles for "Traditional Board" 
Chairman of the Board. As Chairman of the Board, 
it is your job to have the Board reach a decision on the 
two issues within the time allowed. Unfortunately, you 
have only 45 minutes to reach a decision since some of 
the Board members can stay no longer than that. 
Your general philosophy about meetings is to try to 
allow for various sides of the issue to be discussed 
before a decision is reached. 
Legally speaking, a majority vote is required in order to 
reach a decision. You prefer that a consensus be 
reached, but a formal ballot may be used at the end of 
the meeting if necessary. Please record the group deci-
sion on the form which has been given to you and give 
it to the administrator of this case. 
Vice Chairman of the Board. You were the 
President of Upjohn when Panalba was introduced into 
the market. Naturally, you feel that Panalba was, and 
still is, a good product both for Upjohn and for the 
people who have used it. If you didn't feel this way, you 
would never have put Panalba on the market in the first 
place. 
President. You have been President for two years. 
Since your appointment, the economy has slowed down 
and, as a result, company profits have decreased. The 
Panalba problem seems to have surfaced at an especially 
bad time. 
You have been checking out various ways of han-
dling the Panalba problem. One suggestion has been 
sent to you by an Upjohn lawyer. He had seen the 
Panalba issue develop over the past few years. He 
thinks that it would be possible to delay any action by 
the FDA. He suggests that Judge Kent of Kalamazoo (a 
man whom you know personally) would be willing to 
serve an injunction on the FDA. The injunction would 
prohibit the FDA from banning Panalba until such time 
as a formal hearing can be held. The results of the 
hearing, if unfavorable, could then be appealed. In effect, 
the case could be tied up in the courts for years. And, if 
the court action were successful, it would help to 
prevent the FDA from moving against other drug 
products in the future. 
Another suggestion was sent to you by the Upjohn 
lobbyist in Washington. He suggests that it might be 
possible to bring political pressure to bear and to at-
tempt to have Robert Finch, head of HEW (and there-
fore having jurisdiction over the FDA), overrule the 
proposed action by the FDA. 
Vice President and Director. In light of the bad 
publicity given Panalba, you have sought suggestions for 
combatting it, and favor one: that a strong plea be sent 
to all doctors to protest to the FDA on the grounds 
that the FDA would be violating the physician's right to 
prescribe if Panalba were removed. You feel that the 
fact that the doctors have been using Panalba for the 
past 13 years indicates that it must have some value. 
You've been a member of the Board of Directors 
for 8 years and you own 20,000 shares of Upjohn stock. 
Executive Vice President. You have been on the 
Board of Directors since 1955 and you own about 
25,000 shares of Upjohn stock. 
President: William John Upjohn, Assoc., Inc., 
Marketing and Advertising Consultants. You are 
part of the Upjohn family and you own a considerable 
amount of stock. Your consulting firm does most of its 
work for the Upjohn Co. 
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Stockholder. You are a practicing M.D. You've been 
prescribing Panalba for years and you have seen nothing 
wrong with it. 
Description of the Roles for the Democratic 
Board 
The roles of Chairman, President, and Stockholder are 
exactly the same as those for the traditional board. The 
four new roles are as follows. 
Public Representative. You have been selected by 
the Mayor to represent the community interests. The 
Mayor had to find someone who would represent all 
groups in the local community and your decisions are 
reported in the local papers. Prior to the meeting, you 
had not been able to think of any major impact which 
the ban on Panalba might have. True, there will be some 
impact on the employment level, but the community is 
so large that this would be very minor. 
You hold no shares of Upjohn stock. 
Suppliers' Representative. You represent the 
organizations that sell goods and services to Upjohn. 
Upjohn, of course, represents only a small part of each 
supplier's sales. And if the purchase were made instead 
by a competitor of Upjohn, the firm would also obtain  
its supplies from the firms which you represent. Your 
job is to try to make sure that the suppliers receive fair 
treatment. Whether or not Panalba will stay on the 
market is of little importance to the suppliers. 
You own no shares of Upjohn stock. 
Consumer Representative. You are elected by a 
consumer's group. Your job is to ensure that the 
interests of the consumer are protected. Your 
decisions are widely reported by the press and by such 
groups as Consumer's Union. You have reviewed the 
evidence behind the Panalba case and you feel that the 
background information which was sent to the 
members provides a fair picture of the effect of Panalba 
upon consumers. 
You hold no shares of Upjohn stock. 
Employee Representative. You have been elected 
by the employees and they expect you to represent 
their interests. You have been a director since 1969. 
You've given some thought as to what would happen 
if Panalba were to be banned from the market. Ap-
proximately 200 jobs would be eliminated (out of the 
roughly 5,000 jobs at Upjohn). Naturally, your consti-
tuents won't be too happy about this. 
You hold no shares of Upjohn stock. 
*Abstracted from J. Scott Armstrong, “Social Irresponsibility in Management,” Journal of Business Research 
(September 1977), pp. 185-213. 
 
 
The role/individual dichotomy 
 
The Panalba research is one of many studies which have examined the strong influence exercised by 
authority, such as those summarized in Obedience to Authority (Milgram, 1974). These studies reveal that people are 
likely to do things within the framework of a particular organizational role which they would never do as individuals. 
In a sense, a role relieves them of responsibility for their actions. In the Panalba case, the board members 
presumably thought it unfortunate that the chances of consumer death were raised by the use of this product 
as opposed to the use of its substitutes, but in their principal role as stockholder advocates, they did not 
seem to feel responsibility toward consumers. Milgram drew the following conclusion from his research: 
 
... ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on 
their part, can become agents in a terrible, destructive process. Moreover, even 
when the destructive effects of their work becomes patently clear, and they are 
asked to carry out actions incompatible with fundamental standards of morality 
[especially if they are told that they will not be held personally liable for it], 
relatively few people have the resources needed to resist authority.3 
                                                 
3 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). 
Bracketed remarks concerning liability are extrapolated from Milgram’s noted “shock-treatment” 
experiment conducted at Yale University. This experiment, documented in the above work, purported to 
assign subjects randomly to a “teacher” or “learner” role using shocks as punishments. Subjects, believing 
they had been randomly selected as “teachers” (they were actually placed in the role on purpose) 
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Identifying socially responsible directors 
 
Is it possible to tell whether or not a given board member is intrinsically “socially responsible”? 
Research to date suggests that it is not. In the Panalba case, we found no differences among participants 
from 10 countries. Nor was age important, although the older managers exhibited a tendency to act more 
“responsibly.” 
 
It would be difficult, to say the least, to “educate” directors in social responsibility. Long after 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics posed the question “Can ethics be taught?” Baumhart provided evidence that 
neither religious training nor courses in ethics can bring about socially responsible behavior.4 Even if 
corporations could initiate their directors in modes of social consciousness, the corporation might eventually 
expel their own proud creations: consider the typical fate of the whistle-blower in even the well-managed 
corporation.5 
 
Changing the organization 
 
If a corporation wishes to have a socially responsible board, what then can it do? It might consider a 
change in board structure. Another one? the reader may well ask. The board has been through many in this 
decade alone, not to mention the numerous mini-revolutions in board make up which have occurred during 
its history in this country. One aspect of the board’s role has not changed, however: its status as the 
stockholders’ representative. It is this role which, I propose, requires reexamination in light of the Panalba 
paradox. 
 
 
The traditional board role 
 
When directors, behaving in response to their roles, commit what can be considered irresponsible 
acts, can we say that they are doing harm while trying to do good? A review of the empirical evidence, in 
particular the work of Milgram,6 suggests that such is the case. The evidence is consistent with Charles A. 
Reich's view that today evil comes about not when people defy their duty, but when they do it.7 What is the 
key duty of today’s corporate director? How could its fulfillment lead to anything but good? 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
administered successive amounts of shock to other subjects, supposedly randomly selected as “learners” 
(actually, they were actors). Under direct orders from an authority figure (a man in a white coat), they 
upped the voltage as the experiment “required.” When told that they would not be held personally liable for 
their actions, many of them upped the voltage to a supposedly intolerable level. In some cases the teacher 
thought they had killed their subjects. 
4 Raymond Baumhart, Ethics in Business (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1968). 
5 Robert Heilbroner, et al. In the Name of Profit (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972); and Gordon H. Fitch 
and Charles B. Saunders, “Blowing the Whistle: The Limits of Obedience to the Organization,” Business 
and Society Review (Fall 1976), pp. 5-14. 
6 Cf. note 3. 
7 Charles A. Reich, “The Limits of Duty,” The New Yorker, 47 (1971), pp. 52-57. 
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The Questionnaire 
 
We are honored to participate in the research of Dr. J. 
Scott Armstrong, Associate Professor of Marketing at 
the Wharton School. The following questionnaire 
represents a constant in Dr. Armstrong's noted studies of 
social responsibility in corporate direction. Dr. Arm-
strong administered this same questionnaire under 
another title over a period of several years in several 
countries. He and his co-workers supplemented this 
questionnaire with two kinds of role-play experiments: 
one in which each board member was asked to represent 
all corporate interest groups, the other in which each 
member was asked to represent a specific interest group. 
The results of Armstrong's research, published in 1977 
in the Journal of Business Research, have led him to 
form certain conclusions, which we shall send to a 
 
number of prominent corporate constituents, eliciting 
their comments. 
In a future issue, we will publish Professor Armstrong's 
conclusions, along with the statements our panel has 
made about them. We will also tell you how you-as a 
group, and, with your express permission, as in-
dividuals-have answered the “Wondola” questionnaire. 
We hope that you, as corporate leaders, will take the 
time to participate in this ongoing project. Your 
responses, more than those of perhaps any other iden-
tifiable group, can reveal much about the corporate 
decision making process which involves us all. 
Thank you for your attention. 
The Editors 
 
Assume that it is August 1969, and that International Drug Corporation (IDC) has called a special board 
meeting to discuss what should be done with the product known as “Wondola.” 
Wondola is a “fixed-ratio” antibiotic sold by prescription. That is, it contains a combination of drugs. It has 
been highly successful. It now accounts for about 18 million dollars per year, which is 12 percent of IDC's gross 
income in the U.S. (and a greater percentage of net profits). Profits from foreign markets, where Wondola is 
marketed under a different name, are roughly comparable to those in the U. S. 
Over the past 20 years numerous medical scientists (e.g., members of the American Medical Association's 
Council on Drugs) have objected to the sale of most fixed-ratio drugs. Their argument has been that (1) there is 
no evidence that these fixed-ratio drugs have improved benefits over single drugs, and (2) the possibility of 
detrimental side effects, including death, is at least doubled. For example, these scientists have estimated that 
Wondola is causing about 14 to 22 unnecessary deaths per year – i.e., deaths which could be prevented if the 
patients had used a substitute made by a competitor of IDC. Despite these recommendations to remove fixed-
ratio drugs from the market, doctors have continued to use them. They offer a shotgun approach for the doctor 
who is unsure of his diagnosis. 
Recently a National Research Council panel of the National Academy of Science, a group of impartial scientists, 
carried out extensive research studies and recommended unanimously that the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) ban the sale of Wondola. One of the members of the panel was quoted by the press as saying, “There are 
few instances in medicine when so many experts have agreed unanimously and without reservation” (about 
banning Wondola). This view was typical of comments made by other members of the panel. In fact, it was typical 
of comments which had been made about fixed-ratio drugs over the past 20 years. These impartial experts then 
believe that while all drugs have the possibility of side effects, the costs associated with Wondola far exceed the 
possible benefits of those from Wondola, and yet they have no serious side effects. The selling price of the 
substitutes is approximately the same as the price for Wondola. 
IDC's Special Board Meeting has arisen out of an emergency situation. The FDA told IDC that it plans to ban 
Wondola in the U.S. and wants to give IDC time for a final appeal to them. Should the ban become effective, IDC 
would have to stop all sales of Wondola and attempt to remove inventories from the market. IDC has no close 
substitute for Wondola, so consumers will switch to close substitutes which are easily available from other firms. 
Some of these substitutes offer benefits which are equivalent to those from Wondola, and yet they have no 
serious side effects. The selling price of the substitutes is approximately the same as the price for Wondola. 
It is extremely unlikely that bad publicity from this case would have any significant effect upon the long--term 
profits of other products made by IDC. The following possible solutions were considered by the board: 
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a. Recall Wondola immediately and destroy. 
a. Recall Wondola immediately and destroy. 
b. Stop production of Wondola immediately but allow what has been made to be sold. 
c. Stop all advertising and promotion of Wondola but provide it to doctors who request it. 
d. Continue efforts to market Wondola most effectively until its sale is actually banned. 
e. Continue efforts to market Wondola most effectively and take legal, political, and other necessary actions 
to prevent the authorities from banning Wondola. 
 
The members of the board must reach a decision at today's meeting. The Chairman of the Board has provided 
the above-mentioned background information to each of the board members. 
 
Now consider the following questions: 
 
1. If you were chairman of the board at IDC, what decision would you have made: a, b, c, d, or e? 
(Indicate the answer closest to your opinion.) 
2. Assume that IDC selected decision e in this case. In your opinion, did IDC act 
- in a socially responsible manner? 
- in a socially irresponsible manner?  
- no opinion. (Indicate the answer closest to your opinion.) 
3. How would you define a “socially irresponsible act”? 
 
 
The U.S. legal system has advocated a “stockholder representative” role for directors since the early 
days of board organization in this country.8 Summarizing this tradition, Eugene Rostow asserted twenty 
years ago, “The law books have always said that the board of directors owes a single-minded duty of 
unswerving loyalty to the stockholders, and only to the stockholders.”9 A decade ago Phillip Blumberg 
reviewed legal trends to find little change in the primacy of stockholder interests. The American Bar 
Association’s Section on Corporation, Business, and Banking Laws, in its Corporate Director's 
Guidebook,10 reveals that there is nothing new in this stockholder-centered board universe. 
But a hard business-sense case can be made against an exclusively stockholder-oriented board of 
directors. The follow-up Directors & Boards questionnaire stated that in the 1920s some leading 
                                                 
8 See Joseph A. Joyce, “Directors of Corporations,” The Central Law Journal (October 24, 1884), pp. 327-30, 
rep. in Directors & Boards (Summer 1979), pp. 51-57; and Thomas Cochran, “Adjusting to Bigness, 1890-
1930,” 100 Years of American Business (New York: Dell, 1978), pp. 113-72, esp. pp. 168-69, on “Changes 
in Aspects of Major Control,” about the history of director/stockholder relations during that period. 
For an application of the fiduciary duty concept to the manager role, see the Berle-Dodd exchange in the 
following texts: 
Berle, A.A. “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust,” Harvard Law Review, 44 (1931), pp. 1049-1074. 
____. “For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees,” Harvard Law Review, 45 (1932), pp. 1365-1372. 
____, “Foreword in Edward S. Mason, The Corporation in Modern Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1959). 
Dodd, E. Merrick, Jr., “For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?” Harvard Law Review, 45 (1932), 
pp. 1145-1163 
____, “Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?” University 
of Chicago Law Review, No. 2 (1935), pp. 194-207. 
See also Abram Chayes, “The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law,” in Edward S. Mason, ed., The 
Corporation in Modern Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), and Christopher D. Stone, 
Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior (New York: Harper & Row, 1975). 
9 “To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?" in Edward S. Mason, ed., The 
Corporation in Modern Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959). 
10 Reprinted in Business Lawyer (Jan. 1978), pp. 1591-1644, and in the “Director's Update,” Directors & Boards 
(Spring 1978), pp. 41-60. 
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businessmen called for a change in the role of the manager-director [cf. footnote 14]. Instead of representing 
only one party (e.g., the stockholder), he should represent all of the stakeholders in an organization 
(employees, local community, suppliers, stockholders, creditors, and retailers). The stockholder 
representative role advocates that directors make decisions so as to maximize returns to the stockholder. 
Many critics of the traditional representative role of the board have pointed to the negative impact it can 
have outside the strictly profit-oriented business realm on issues such as environmental pollution, employee 
rights, and product safety. I propose that in serving stockholders’ interests alone, directors may also be 
contributing to the weakening of both individual companies and the free marketplace in which they operate. 
Consider an all-too-well-known example from the merger field: the unfriendly takeover attempt. Such 
attempts often yield substantial stockholder rewards in terms of price offered for shares at the time of 
purchase. But something there is that doesn't love a raid. What is it? Loyalty to management employees? To 
consumers? One could say that the sagas of McGraw-Hill and Houghton Mifflin were filled with such 
considerations. 
 
On a more general, economic level, some decisions which benefit the stockholder can actually 
weaken the free-enterprise system. Increase in the imperfections of the market can also increase stockholder 
dividends in the triumphant corporations. When entry of new competitors is restricted, the famous “tacit” 
collusion among oligopolistic competitors grows, and consumer free choice is restricted. The stockholder 
may win in these cases – but at a high price to the free market.11 
 
 
The “stakeholder” theory 
 
Assume that groups a, b, and c find themselves involved in a single undertaking in which each 
group’s input is necessary for satisfactory performance. Now, for whom does the system really exist – for a? 
for b? for c? One cannot answer this query as it stands. But when a, b, and c are labeled as stockholder, 
employee, and customer, the situation comes to life and we can answer the question-or think we can. 
Tradition has taught us to see this system as stockholder-centered, as in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
The Stockholder Role 
 
STOCKHOLDERS
MANAGEMENT
Competitors
Local Community
Customers
Employees Retailers
Creditors
Suppliers
 
 
 
The favoring of one corporate constituency over another can harm the other constituencies if they 
have no recourse, as in the hypothetical “free-market” economy, to alternative corporate affiliations. In the 
“perfect” marketplace, unlimited possibilities for employment, purchases, etc. mitigate the harm a monistic 
constituency orientation can do. To take an example from the other end of the politico-economic world, the 
                                                 
11 Cf. my article “The Manager's Dilemma: Role Conflict in Marketing,” in George Fisk, et al., eds., Future 
Directions for Marketing (Cambridge, MA: Marketing Science Institute, 1978), pp. 78-89. It is interesting to 
note that a Council for a Competitive Economy has formed which argues in its promotional brochure that 
“many businessmen actually prefer not to operate in a free market.” In demanding government protection in 
order to serve their stockholders, “business itself has become a threat to its own survival.” 
 9
Yugoslavian economy favors wage-earners to the detriment of profit.12 This exclusivity of corporate 
accountability would also be termed “irresponsible” in the pluralistic stakeholder theory. 
 
To return to the contemporary corporate dilemma, how can companies see to it that their boards 
avoid harming the free-enterprise process? It is obvious that we cannot completely eradicate the 
imperfections of the market, but implementation of the stakeholder theory might reduce them. Other 
approaches to pluralizing corporate accountability include class action suits, exposes of irresponsible board 
actions, and strict product liability laws for both officers and directors. 
 
This paper considers yet another approach. It shows how a corporation might change the director’s 
self-perception from that of a stockholder representative to one in which he views himself as responsible to 
all groups affected by the firm's actions in a free-market economy. In this model, the director is considered a 
stakeholder representative.13 
 
 
Many masters 
 
In contrast to the stockholder-representative role, or any other “suboptimization” approach, the 
stakeholder-representative role suggests that the director serve many masters. He or she is responsible to a, 
b, and c. A distinction is drawn, however, between primary and secondary interest groups. A primary 
stakeholder representative is affected by the decisions of the firm and also makes some contributions to it. A 
secondary stakeholder is affected by the firm's decisions, but makes no direct contributions to it. An 
illustration of management’s relationship to the primary and secondary stockholders for a typical firm is 
presented in Figure 2. (The secondary stakeholders are designated by a dotted line.) 
 
Figure 2 
The Stakeholder Role 
 
MANAGEMENT
Competitors
Local Community
Customers
Employees Retailers
Creditors
Suppliers
Other
(at company
discretion)
Stockholders
 
 
 
A board operating within the stakeholder role would try to ensure that the marginal rate of return on 
contributions to the firm is equal for each of the primary constituencies, while seeing that its actions wreak 
no unnecessary harm on its company's competitors. Two-way arrows appear in Figure 2 to indicate that 
management should take the initiative in keeping the interest groups informed, and in seeing that they are 
adequately rewarded. 
 
                                                 
12 Cf. Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation (New York: Schocken, 1968); and 
Jaroslav Vanek, The Participatory Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971). 
13 This attempt to change directors’ perceptions of their roles is consistent with one of the conclusions drawn 
from obedience studies: “Control the manner in which a man interprets his world, and you have gone a long 
way toward controlling his behavior.” Milgram, op. cit, p. 143. This behavioralist phrase may send a chill 
through director-readers who, possessing a sense of free will in a free market, do not aspire to be controlled. 
The “control function,” however, is a classical management aspect of an enterprise, along with planning, 
coordinating, directing, etc. Directors both contribute to and are affected by this function. 
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Businessmen in the 1920s advocated a stakeholder role for the board. In 1929, Owen D. Young, 
Chairman of General Electric, argued that it was the duty of directors to see that the interest of each 
corporate constituency be fully recognized and protected.14 
 
Frank M. Abrams, then Chairman of Standard Oil of New Jersey, advanced a similar idea in the 
Harvard Business Review in 1951. Recalling his thesis twenty years later, the HBR said that 
 
It was Mr. Abrams’ conviction that a company’s duty is to serve as fairly and as 
equitably as it can the interest of four sometimes competing groups-owners, 
employees, customers, and the public ... Ideally they are all accommodated in 
major decisions and policies.15 
 
The stakeholder theory advanced here advocates responsibility to all of the board’s interest groups 
and to those interest groups alone. Each corporation must ascertain who its own constituencies are. The 
theory does not advocate that the manager act in the best interests of “society,” a concept which, in its 
vagueness, may lead to arbitrary actions. If General Motors donated money to the University of 
Pennsylvania, its contribution would be responsible only if the university contributed to and/or was effected 
by the company’s choices. The burden of proof would be upon the board to show that a particular charitable 
donation was a good “investment” for the primary stakeholders (if, for example, the University of 
Pennsylvania typically produced a number of engineers or research scientists who have done significant 
work for GM). 
 
Is it possible? 
 
The law sees directors as stockholder representatives. Nothing short of a boardroom “campaign” for 
the stakeholder notion could change that. Is such a movement likely? Ralph Nader’s attempt to encourage 
board representativeness, Campaign GM, only garnered 3 percent of the shareholders’ votes.16 Recent 
research, however, indicates that the attitudes of executives concerning their accountability are changing. 
This change might one day have an impact on their attitudes as directors. Surveys of Harvard Business 
Review readers have indicated that the notion of stakeholder representation is not alien to managerial 
attitudes of this decade. The HBR reported in 1971 that the majority – 61 percent – of respondents subscribe 
to the concept Frank Abrams set forth in the HBR in 1951.17 A survey of HBR readers’ sense of 
accountability in 1977 reveals that the executives who responded rank their constituencies in the following 
order of importance: customers, stockholders, employees, local community where company operates, society 
in general, suppliers, and government.18 
 
This is what managers say, the reader might protest, but how would they act if they were actually 
assigned roles which champion the constituencies which they deem so vital to the corporate enterprise? My 
early Panalba research provides some answers. Keeping in mind the charge that rule by all would become 
rule by none – a challenge the above-cited Rostow aimed at the stakeholder debate in the late Fifties – we 
attempted to determine whether we could get the subjects which we had placed in stockholder-representative 
roles to change their voting patterns if they were placed in stakeholder-representative roles. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Howard R. Bowen, Social Responsibilities of the Businessman (New York: Harper Brothers, 1953), p. 49. 
15 David Ewing, “Who Wants Corporate Democracy,” Harvard Business Review, 49 (Sept.-Oct. 1971), p. 146. 
16 Donald E. Schwartz, “The Public Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM,” Michigan Law 
Review, 69 (January 1971), pp. 419-538. 
17 Ewing, op. cit. 
18 Steven N. Brenner and Earl A. Molander, “Is the Ethics of Business Changing?” Harvard Business Review, 55 
(Jan.-Feb., 1977), pp. 12-18, 146-49. 
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Stakeholder role adopted 
 
We used two different methods to introduce the stakeholder model into our experiments. One was to 
say that the board believed in the stakeholder role, appending the following statement to each subject’s role 
description: 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the members of the Upjohn Board had a number 
of discussions in the past as to the proper role that a board member should take. A 
resolution had been passed in 1950 which stated that the Board’s duty was to 
recognize the interests of each and every one of its “interest groups” or 
“stakeholders.” The stakeholders are those groups which make specific 
contributions to the firm. Thus, the board is to consider the effects of decisions 
upon employees, creditors, stockholders, customers, suppliers, distributors and the 
local community. Furthermore, the board should consider only its own stakeholders 
in making decisions. It shall not attempt to serve the common good or society in 
general. (All of the current board members are well aware of this policy statement.) 
 
Note that these instructions did not command the subject to take on the stakeholder role, but merely 
stated that the board advocated such a role. Beyond this, the role descriptions were identical to those which 
described the traditional, Upjohn-like board. 
 
The other set of instructions placed each board member in a particular stakeholder role. No single 
group dominated the board in this version of the experiment. The Chairman, President and stockholder 
represented were based on traditional models. In addition, however, there was one representative for each of 
the major constituencies a typical stakeholder board might recognize: employees, customers, suppliers, and 
local communities. In addition, each of the subjects in the stakeholder version was provided with findings from a 
“social accounting” of the various impacts the sale of the drug would have on all its corporate constituents. (See 
Table 1: the figures were created by the author to dramatize the extreme nature of this case.) 
 
Table 1 
Accounting Provided in Panalba Case: Estimated Losses (in Millions of Dollars)* 
Alternatives Stockholders Customers Employees Total Losses 
 
a. Recall immediately  
b. Stop production  
c. Stop promotion 
d. Continue until banned  
e. Prevent ban 
(1) 
20.0 
13.0 
12.0 
11.0 
  4.0 
(2) 
0.0 
13.6 
16.8 
19.6 
33.8 
(3) 
2.0 
18 
1.2 
1.0 
0.2 
(1)+(2)+(3) 
22.0 
28.4 
30.0 
31.6 
39.0 
 
* These estimates represent present value losses to each group affected by this decision. The losses to 
customers represent deaths and illnesses caused by Panalba for which no compensation is received; losses 
to employees represent lost wages and moving expenses beyond those covered by severance pay and 
unemployment benefits. 
 
If we consider a the best board choice, the second experiment can be termed successful. Its results are 
summarized in Table 2. Only 22 percent of the stakeholder groups selected choice e (vs. 79 percent of those placed 
in the traditional role), and 21 percent of the groups removed the drug from the market. (These results were 
statistically significant at p < .01). 
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Table 2 
Percentage of Groups Selecting Each Decision in the Panalba Case 
Tendency to support choice e Traditional 
Stakeholder 
Instruction 
Democratic 
Board 
 
High 
Moderate 
None 
(Number of groups 
 
76 
24 
  0 
(41) 
 
23 
65 
12 
(57) 
 
22 
49 
29 
(59) 
 
 
The response of D&B readers 
 
In order to further my research on board responsibility and the stakeholder role, I published my 
questionnaire in the Winter 1979 issue of Directors and Boards and requested that readers respond. Later that year, 
the Editors followed up on the project by writing to some readers and prominent figures. Their responses are 
reprinted in the following pages. Reactions of readers varied. George Dillon, President and Chairman of Butler 
Manufacturing Company, seems to welcome the notion of a board which subscribes to the stakeholder theory. 
Dennis Livadas, a Rochester attorney, opposes it vehemently. Then there is David McLaughlin, CEO and Chairman 
of Toro Corporation, who asserts that questionnaire limitations cannot encompass such a complex issue. This might 
explain why the questionnaire attracted so few responses. Or perhaps readers did not respond because the 
stakeholder notion challenges us to actually implement in the corporation democratic values more easily cited than 
accomplished. 
 
Finally, anthropologist Ashley Montagu replied, with another viewpoint on the issue of corporate 
responsibility, proposing yet other qualifications – and challenges – for the director: 
 
Until we can restore education to its humanizing role, we are going to have a hard time 
recognizing that the best way to select corporate directors and managers would be on the 
basis of two primary qualifications: that they be first, loving persons, and second, intel-
ligent enough to meet the challenges of each situation, as it arises, with the most 
appropriately successful response. Finally, the double standard of morality-one for 
business and another for the role-playing disguises of everyday life-must go. 
If we could act in one consistent manner as loving and intelligent people, we would need no stakeholder 
board structure. As the human race stands now, however, the board must be designed in a way which promotes, 
intelligently and humanely, long-term economic good. The stakeholder-representative model might just fit that 
description.  
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READER RESPONSES FOLLOW 
 
Response to Reader Questionnaire  
1. If you were chairman of the board at IDC, what decision would you have made, a, b, c, d, or e? 
 
a 
 
2. Assume that IDC selected decision e in this case. In your opinion, did IDC act 
 
         in a socially responsible manner? 
      in a socially irresponsible manner? 
         no opinion. 
 
3. How would you define a “socially irresponsible act”? 
 
One that proves to be unethical or illegal. 
 
4. Dr. Armstrong states that: 
 
According to previous studies, education will not lead to a reduction in socially irresponsible 
acts by corporate directors. Nor do we know how to select directors who are less likely to 
commit irresponsible acts. It seems likely then that some institutional change is needed. In the 
1920s, some leading businessmen called for a change in the role of the manager-director. 
Instead of representing only one party (e.g., the stockholder), he should represent all the 
stakeholders in an organization [employees, local community, suppliers, stockholders, 
creditors, and retailers]. 
 
 Do you think that corporations should be run “democratically” in this sense? 
 
  Yes, in the sense that directors clearly have a responsibility to a corporation’s entire constituency 
and in many instances may have a legal liability. 
 
5. What is the likelihood that they will be? 
 
Much greater likelihood, and the change is already in process in many well-managed companies. 
 
George C. Dillon 
Chairman and President 
Butler Manufacturing Company 
Kansas City, MO 
 
 
To the Editors: 
In response to your questionnaire: 
1. 1 would have made a combined decision of b and c. I would have stopped production, 
advertising and promotion of Wondola immediately, but would have allowed what 
had been produced to be sold to doctors who requested it. For liability protection, I 
would have included a special warning about fixed-ratio drugs in a circular or on 
labels provided with the drug. 
2. By selecting decision e they acted in a socially irresponsible manner. 
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3. The term “socially irresponsible act” has to be defined in relation to a specific set of 
facts. It is socially irresponsible to arbitrarily affect the earnings of the corporation to 
the detriment of the shareholders. However, it is more socially irresponsible to 
continue active efforts to market a drug which can take lives in the name of profits 
only. If the drug were sold under controlled conditions, shareholders could have a 
return on equity without endangering the lives of many otherwise unsuspecting 
individuals. 
4. In answer to the first question, yes, I believe corporations should be run 
“democratically,” that director-managers should represent all of the stakeholders in 
an organization-employees, local community, suppliers, stockholders, creditors and 
retailers. 
With respect to the second question, what is the likelihood that corporations will be 
run democratically, my answer would be, “diminishing all the time, but hopefully not 
irreversibly.” 
The main consideration is not whether corporations will or won’t be run democratically 
in the future, but rather what are the effects of their not having been run that way in the 
past. A good segment of the American public is disillusioned with both big and little 
business. This could create a very dangerous shift in the fundamental philosophy of the 
American public which may have devastating effects on our posterity. And that, coupled 
with the “free lunch” attitude fostered in the youth of America by our failing educational 
institutions, forebodes serious dangers for us all. 
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in your research. 
 
Charles E. Davis  
Law Offices of Udall, Shumway, Blackhurst, Allen, Bentley & Lyons, P.C. 
Mesa, Arizona 
 
 
To the Editors: 
Responding to the “Wondola” questionnaire and story problem in the current issue of Directors 
and Boards, my recommendation as Chairman of IDC would unquestionably be a – to recall 
“Wondola” from the market immediately and destroy or dispose of the compound.. 
The biases underlying my response will be understandable, considering my position with the 
Michigan Cancer Foundation, but I thought it would be useful to you for your data to reflect at least 
one view from the non-profit sector, and from the health care sector specifically. 
The assessment of social responsibility (or, in your framing of the question, irresponsibility) in a 
complex, technological society is a complex problem. In general, it might be said that action or 
behavior which is most consonant with or which better serves “the common good” (of the community, 
of society) is the more “socially responsible” action or behavior. It is equally true that in a free-
enterprise economic system, it is only through the application of excess profits from the producing 
sector that projects and programs of social reform (i.e., programs to improve the commonweal) can 
find their support and their sustenance. 
The making of profits, therefore, is not only socially responsible but is socially imperative in the 
kind of society in which we live, assuming that the activity from which these profits come does not 
violate other canons of the social contract to which both the producers and the consumers in the 
community subscribe. (Indeed, had you posed a problem in which IDC’s sole source of income and 
profits was the sale of “Wondola,” the overall question of the company’s response would be 
considerably stickier.) 
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The canon which any other but choice a would violate, in my view, is that members of a society 
should not be exposed to unnecessary or avoidable risks (physical, economic of psychological) in the 
pursuit of income and profits by any other members) of that society. 
Some risks – or example, in administering experimental drugs, in taking up the sport of skiing – 
are in certain instances both necessary and unavoidable, but even in these situations, society (through 
its lawmakers) insists (1) that the risks be very clearly and comprehensively elucidated to those who 
are to be exposed to them, and (2) that those exposed specifically signify their consent to participate in 
the exposure. 
The concept of “risk” is not an absolute one, and the data given in your story problem (i.e., that 
“Wondola” causes 14-22 deaths per year) are not sufficient to define the real hazard the drug presents. 
Only by knowing how many persons are exposed to “Wondola” each year, and then how many of these 
experience its dire effects, could one accurately assess the level of risk reasonably associable with 
exposure to the drug. One would also have to know, of course, the dosages at which the side effect is 
most pronounced and other variables of the victims'’ environmental and biological status, in order to 
determine how isolatable – and therefore how avoidable – the risks inherent in the drug really are. 
Complicating the issue of “Wondola’s” risk even further, the “common good” would not suffer 
substantially by the total withdrawal of the drug, for it is given that the public have access to close 
substitutes of comparable efficacy and considerably less inherent risk. Again, your problem would be 
considerably stickier were “Wondola” sui generis among those available in the pharmocopoeia. 
In view of the epidemiological data, the findings of the FDA (however conservative 
that agency’s policies sometimes seem), the availability of adequate substitutes, and the 
presumably non-vital nature of “Wondola's” contribution to IDC's profit picture, there are, 
it seems to me, no compelling arguments for the company to consider any action except 
compliance with the FDA’s proposed ban, and good reason to conclude that any other 
choice would, under the circumstances, represent a “socially irresponsible act.” 
Why do corporations continue, however, to behave in a way that others in society see as 
irresponsible, and how can the frequency of socially irresponsible acts by corporations be 
reduced? 
Professor Armstrong suggests that since “we (do not) know how to select directors who 
are less likely to commit irresponsible acts,” some form of “institutional change” will be 
required. This is problematic, however, when one considers the essential synonymy 
between the “we” who select corporate directors and the “them” responsible for effecting 
changes in institutions. Institutions change only by changing their policy, and since policy 
is the prerogative solely of the directors, institutional change can only occur when the 
directors change, or when they change their mind. If we are indeed doomed to select 
“irresponsible” directors, then we are likewise doomed to an eternity of irresponsible 
corporate policy. 
I doubt, however, that Professor Armstrong would contend that corporations today are 
significantly more socially irresponsible than they were, say, in the freewheeling, pre-
Depression ‘20s. My own senses tell me that American corporations are steadily moving 
toward more pluralistic modes of policy decision-making, not necessarily because the 
“stockholder” role has become any less central, but because the “stakeholders” in American 
corporations have found ways other than the share-vote – including union actions, boycotts, 
injunctive relief, legislative appeals, community actions, newspaper campaigns – to 
influence corporate decisions/ 
These have all had the effect of making corporate decision makers ever more aware of, 
and vulnerable to, other interests and power modalities within the social structure. There 
may be a social “law” to the effect that a corporation will behave as irresponsibly vis-à-vis 
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the society as its community allows it to behave, but if this is the case, then its behavior 
can hardly be called a crime. I think American society is asking more and more of its 
corporations, and by and large, I think we are getting it. 
I would hope that the real-life progenitor of the Wondola case put forward by Dr. 
Armstrong (the Panalba case involving the Upjohn Company) represents a waning trend, 
especially in those industries whose actions and products touch the health of the species. 
Edward Shaw 
Director of Planning and Program Development  
Meyer L. Prentis Cancer Center  
110 E. Warren Avenue  
Detroit, Michigan 48201 
 
 
To the Editors: 
 
I have your letter to Mr. Ford requesting a response to questions on corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
The Board of Directors of Ford Motor Company formally addressed this issue in its 
“Statement of Corporate Purpose” published in the 1978 Annual Report. I have enclosed a 
copy for your information. 
 
T. P. Rhoades, Jr. 
Stockholder Relations Department Ford Motor Company 
Dearborn, Michigan 
 
 
STATEMENT OF CORPORATE PURPOSE 
 
Ford Motor Company is in business to create profits for its owners by serving the automotive, 
agricultural and communications needs of the worldwide society. 
 
We seek to meet those needs by developing, building and marketing products that are fully 
responsive to the public's requirements for utility, safety, economy and high value. 
 
We have a responsibility also to design our products in such a way as to provide for efficient use of 
energy and raw materials and for the protection of our natural environment. 
 
We believe that Ford employees have a right to decent working conditions, good compensation and 
the opportunity for advancement on the basis of individual merit. Our doors are open to men and 
women alike without discrimination and without regard to ethnic origin or personal beliefs. 
 
The Company does not stand alone in fulfilling its purposes. We are dependent upon thousands of 
other businesses throughout the world-independent dealers who market our products at retail and 
firms of all sizes that supply us with essential materials and services. Our relationships with dealers 
and suppliers alike are based upon mutual interest and respect and a recognition of the inter-
dependence that binds us together and creates an even greater force for economic good. 
 
Although Ford Motor Company was founded in the United States where it maintains its corporate 
headquarters, it is in fact a worldwide enterprise with subsidiaries, branches and affiliates in many 
countries. We subscribe to the principle of free trade on equal terms among all nations. As corporate 
citizens, we look to the governments of those countries in which we operate to permit free 
expression of our views on issues that concern our business. We refrain from involvement in purely 
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political matters, but participate openly in the process of government within the limits allowed by 
law and custom. 
 
Both as a private corporation with a handful of owners and, more recently, as a publiclyowned 
corporation with more than 350,000 shareholders, Ford Motor Company has prospered wherever 
free market conditions prevail. We believe strongly in the competitive system and are convinced that 
the public, worldwide, is best served when competitive forces are at work in the marketplace. 
 
Beyond its purely economic interests, Ford Motor Company recognizes a need to work for the 
advancement of human welfare in all societies. It provides continuing support of a wide variety of 
educational, work training, cultural, civic improvement and charitable programs aimed at enriching 
human life. It seeks to expand opportunities for self-help and economic independence among those 
who can contribute much to their own societies and to the world at large. 
 
Philip Caldwell  
President and Vice Chairman of the Board 
 
Henry Ford II  
Chairman of the Board 
 
William C. Ford 
Chairman of the Executive Committee 
 
 
To The Editors: 
In response to your questionnaire: 
Question 1. I would have marked choice d. The product cannot be condemned on the basis of 
an ad hoc “say so.” While remaining open to proof, management should continue 
to market the product. 
Question 2. I would deem IDC’s decision “socially responsible.” 
Question 3. In the context of “Wondola,” social irresponsibility would begin with intense and 
continued marketing after the FDA, having examined competent research, had 
reliably verified the accusations. 
The final questions require a response in essay form, to wit: 
Conventional political wisdom holds that a government owes its form and quality to the 
concerns and experiences of the society it governs. So too with economic systems: the 
institutions they contain develop naturally out of the trade and business needs of their 
constituencies. If people get the government they deserve, they get the business methods they 
create. 
From the same national ethos that governs the republic, the business corporation evolved; 
and the status and powers of the latter's directors closely resemble the position of the former’s 
policy-makers. They all rest solidly on long-developed traditions of representation, enterprising 
competition, continuity, majority rule, and orderly procedures under prescribed powers subject 
to periodic accountability and review, all according to law. Directors, at their peril, have to 
show good results for their stewardship, i.e., innovation, quality, productivity, marketing, and 
profits. The commitment to obtain these must precede other decisions. If the company is to 
survive, its directors must have the power not only to debate but to decide, and to decide on 
matters which will optimize “results.” 
So it may be unwise, as well as unfair, to charge today's directors with “social 
irresponsibility” simply because they are doing their job right. The words “social 
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irresponsibility” portray profit-seeking directors as blameworthy per se. For this reason it is 
perhaps their detractors who could be called irresponsible. 
In our categorically specialized socioeconomic society, directors are supposed to monitor 
corporate activities with profit in mind, and the government is supposed to protect the public 
from their possible “mistakes.” Let each do its own job. Neither is equipped to do the other’s 
work. 
In our carefully balanced politico-legal system of sophisticated rights, powers, duties, and 
liabilities, the director’s position and actions are minutely prescribed; there are too many 
prescribers looking over directors’ shoulders for them to indulge in personal sympathies. 
Directors must be recruited from the same backgrounds from which they have traditionally 
been drafted (business, law, accounting). These types have served us well. Why change? 
Dennis J. Livadas 
Attorney at Law  
800 East Avenue  
Rochester, N.Y. 14607 
 
To the Editors: 
While I respect the objectives of your recent survey to define corporate 
attitudes and positions on corporate responsibility decision making, we 
have decided to abstain from responding, for we do not believe that 
complicated situations such as the Wondola case depicts are subject to 
simplistic answers. Our own experience indicates that a manager would 
need considerably more information about the nature of the problem and 
the environment in which it exists before reaching any conclusion on the 
course of action to be taken. 
I wish you every success in the future with your publication, and while 
I regret that we cannot be more helpful to you on this project, we continue 
to admire the fine service which Directors and Boards  provides the 
business community. 
 
David T McLaughlin 
CEO and Chairman  
The Toro Company  
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
 
 
 
It is important to recognize that we have very little, if any, [democracy] in the 
Western World. What we have is “instruction," a training in techniques and skills 
devoted to achievement of “success,” in a society in which the “successful” (in terms of 
external validations) end up by becoming the victors who belong to the spoils. 
“Education” (from educare, to nourish and to cause to grow) should mean the art and 
science of being a successful human being, one who is able to relate himself to others 
in a creatively enlarging manner; one who lives as a healthy human being, which means 
through the ability to love, to work, to play, and to use one's mind soundly; one who 
lives as if to live and love were one. Until we can restore education to its humanizing 
role we are going to have a hard time recognizing that the best way to select corporate 
directors and managers would be on the basis of two primary qualifications: first, as a 
loving person, and second, as one who is intelligent enough to meet the challenges of 
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each situation as it arises with the most appropriately successful response. Finally, the 
double standard of morality – one for business, and another for the role-playing 
disguises of everyday life – must go. 
Ashley Montagu 
